Introduction S
trategic spot sales to Asia and Chinese teapot refiners show promise as a means to increase market share in the region. But at what price? Is it reasonable to assume that increased sales of spot crude oil to a region will have no implications for world oil prices and the demand for long-term contracts? This study examines the potential implications of spot sales from a hypothetical joint stockpiling facility located close to China for a major producing company located in the Middle East in the context of a bigger market penetration of teapot refineries. The analysis will be conducted in light of the potential implications of these sales for the major producing company that is subject to strict production quotas.
Reference scenario: no impact
In the reference case, the strategic sale of crude oil to Chinese teapot refiners is assumed to have no impact on either world oil prices or existing term contracts. This is a realistic proposition: Existing production quotas on Middle Eastern producing companies (MEP) means the total quantity of crude oil produced and released onto world oil markets will be unchanged. The implications, if any, of increased spot sales to the region are likely to be a short-term reduction in local oil prices, and changes in the future demand for long-term contracts. Under this neutral scenario, or base case, the cost and benefits analysis of spot crude sales from the joint stockpiling facilities will be determined solely by the strategic options valuation model developed in the recent KAPSARC study by Considine et al. (2019) .
Alternative Scenario 1: negative impact
In the first alternative scenario, the sale of spot crude to China results in a reduction in both world oil prices
The Okinawa joint oil stockpiling facility
The facility is located no more than three days sailing from key markets in China and is ideally positioned as a strategic petroleum reserve for International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries during times of crises and tight markets. The facility has additional value in its capacity to provide an excellent central location for the sale of spot crude to Chinese teapot refineries. Crude deliveries can reach tight markets in a few days and can be available for pickup in quantities appropriate for specific market disruptions. As a result, spot sales and the sales of call options on crude oil have the potential to address sporadic and unanticipated increases in demand without adding sustained, downward pressure on regional oil prices, or term contracts. Introduction and the prices of MEP term contracts to China. In this scenario, the increase in spot oil sales fulfills some extra-pent up demand, and the incremental volumes result in a slight reduction in world oil prices. We assume a 2.5% reduction in global and term oil prices and assess the impact on the value of spot oil sales to the teapot refiners.
Alternative Scenario 2: positive impact
In this scenario, spot deals not only open up new markets but also lead to more term contracts in the region. The additional volumes displace competing crude from Russia and other competitors, leading to more long-term term contracts for the MEP. For comparison, we assume a 2.5% increase in oil prices for term contracts for MEPs' sour crudes and assess the results. Under this scenario, the net effects of selling spot crudes to Chinese teapot refineries from the joint stockpiling facility at Okinawa are enhanced by additional benefits derived from increases in crude oil prices and volumes of term sales.
It is important to note that the Middle Eastern producing company is subject to production quotas, not sales quotas. As a result, the increased spot sales do not necessarily have to come at the expense of fewer long term contracts -or a reduction in long term contracts in the region, so long as the production constraints are not violated.
Spot sales from strategically placed joint stockpiling facilities can enhance a major oil company's market share in Asia. This paper utilizes a valuation methodology developed by Considine et al. (2019) to determine the potential value of spot sales from these facilities, under the assumptions outlined in the three scenarios listed above, from the perspective of an MEP.
The main body of this paper is organized as follows: The first section documents the rise of the teapot refiners, with special attention given to the flow of oil across the Chinese border, and the rising levels of crude oil imports and exports of petroleum products. The second section examines the proposition that the rise of spot crude oil sales to China has come at the expense of long-term and short-term contracts. A quantitative analysis supports the proposition that this is not a foregone conclusion, suggesting that the use of spot sales to increase market share does not necessarily come at the expense of existing term contracts.
The third section outlines the project assumptions underlying the base or reference case.
The potential incremental value of the strategic spot sales is quantified in the fourth section. These first four sections form the basis of the analysis for the reference case and assume that the spot sales of crude oil have no impact on world oil prices, the official Saudi selling price, and the sale of short-term and long-term contracts to existing customers.
Note: Technically there is no official Saudi selling price but an official pricing differential, or pricing formula that is announced in advance of the actual sales date. The pricing formula used to price crude oil sales to Asia was changed in October 2018: "Under the new terms, Saudi Aramco's official selling price for October will be based on the average settlement prices for the DME December Oman contract and the December Dubai cash price assessed by Platts, both of which are set in October." (Tan 2018) The final section identifies several variables as potential sources of uncertainty that can change the model results significantly. These are selected for sensitivity analysis and modeled in terms of appropriate probability distribution functions. A sensitivity analysis is performed using Monte T he target market for the MEPs is China's Shandong Province, where most Chinese teapot refineries are concentrated. China has a very large refining sector and is the world's top crude oil importer. The teapot refineries in China are owned by local governments and independent private players outside the four major national oil companies (NOCs), and they play an important role both in refining and importing. The four NOCs are the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its publicly listed company PetroChina, Sinopec and its listed company Sinopec Corp., China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and its listed company CNOOC Ltd, and Sinochem. At the start of 2017, China had a crude distillation capacity of 14.5 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d). The combined installed capacity of the above four NOCs and their affiliated joint ventures accounted for about three quarters of the total. The residual, approximately one quarter, or nearly 3.7 MMbbl/d, is in the hands of teapot refineries (Wu and Brown 2017) (See Figure 1 and Table 1 ).
Chinese teapot refineries have a long and fascinating history. Two decades ago they were small in size. For nearly a decade after China's major reorganization of its oil and gas industry in 1998, the teapot refineries had a difficult time, with the government The surge of teapot refineries has been relentless, despite continuous restrictions by the central government. A new era began for them when Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013. The Chinese government started incorporating the teapot refineries into the country's oil and refining system, giving them a share of the market through legislation (Downs 2017). A policy allowing Chinese teapot refineries to buy spot crude on the world oil market was implemented in late 2015, following a couple of years of preparation, leading to the increasing share of teapot refineries in China's crude oil imports. Chinese teapot refineries are here to stay and continue to grow. It is a segment of the global oil market that the MEPs cannot ignore. There are at least three strategies that companies can take advantage of to penetrate this growing segment of the Chinese oil market. The first is establishing a partnership between the teapot refineries and Chinese NOCs. This has progressed only slowly. The second is forming an alliance or merging with teapot refineries to be one of a few conglomerates Index Units Per Person, not seasonally adjusted so as to better qualify as importers of crude oil in the global market and sign term contracts. The teapot refineries can improve their credit rating through merging and forming conglomerates, thereby facilitating the term contracts which require a credit line of $1 billion (Downs 2017). This is happening right now but will take some time to be fully functional. MEPs could also find creative ways to enter the Chinese teapot refinery market. Selling spot cargos from conveniently located joint stockpiling sites in Northeast Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, is one way to move in this direction and is the focus of this paper.
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The History and Current Status of Crude Imports and Crude Oil Runs From Chinese Teapot Refiners
Nothing is guaranteed: While Chinese teapot refiners have successfully navigated all of the regulatory challenges facing the industry to date, their ensured success and growth are not guaranteed. A new period of radical reform in China's domestic oil industry could result in the decline of the teapot refineries through competition, or diktat, though there is currently no sign of this happening any time soon. There are pros and cons to the three strategies that the MEPs can use to increase market share with teapot refineries. While a thorough discussion of these is beyond the scope of this analysis, the first -teaming up with the teapots and Chinese NOCs, and merging and/or forming a conglomerate with the teapots -will take a considerable amount of time. The third method, spot sales to the teapots, can be achieved immediately and with fewer long-term consequences should regulation of the industry take a sudden adverse turn.
Chronology of events: The rise of the Chinese teapot refineries Early history: 1960s-1970s
The teapot refineries are built as small facilities, typically near oilfields or ports in China. Approximately 70% are located in Shandong province.
Early history: 1990s-2014
The reform of China's NOCs in the late 1990s leads to the forced closure of teapot refineries.
From 1995 to 2014, the number of teapot refineries falls by over 50%.
Teapot refineries are restricted to run on a mix of domestic crude and various middle distillates such as fuel oil from the NOCs.
In 2014, Xi Jinping begins to contemplate a different approach, favoring the teapot refineries.
2015
China allows teapot refiners to start processing imported crude oil, with a number of refiners allowed to import crude directly.
Eleven refiners are given permits to import 987,000 bbl/d of crude.
The government shuts down crude oil distillation units with a capacity of under 40,000 bbl/d, in an effort to upgrade the industry's efficiency. Teapot refiners are encouraged to close inefficient crude distillation units in return for additional crude import quotas (Zhou and Jaipuriyar 2018) .
Utilization rates at China's independent refiners average 41.4%.
2016
Nineteen independent refiners are allowed to import 1.5 MMbbl/d of crude (Raval and Hume 2017 (Xiu 2017 ). -The processing rates at independent refiners reach as high as 60.2% in 2017. A new nationwide mandate to expand the mandatory use of E10 fuel -a gasoline containing 10% ethanol -is expanded from 11 trial provinces to the whole of China by 2020 (Paraskova 2018a ).
The independent non-state refineries are given permits to import 2.86 MMbbl/d of crude in 2018, a 55% increase over the 1.84 MMbbl/d permitted in 2017.
Environmental and safety checks are strengthened. In Shandong, 10 key independent refiners with a combined capacity of 400,000 bbl/d are forced to prolong maintenance, and several small refiners suspend operations.
-The refinery throughput rates reach levels as low as 10.71 bbl/d, as state firms and independent refineries compete for market share in a loose market with high levels of inventories (Paraskova 2017) . In October, 20 central government bodies draft a memorandum of understanding to tighten the monitoring of the sector, hoping to stop tax avoidance and the illegal trade in quotas (Meidan 2017) .
2018
The government eases controls on crude imports and product exports, though independent refiners are not yet given export quotas.
Independent refiners are permitted to export refined products and are given export quotas.
Saudi Arabia ships two cargos to Longkou in China, including a 730,000 bbl cargo on the Aframax Alyarmouk from the Okinawa terminal in Japan in May. These are the first shipments to teapot refineries (Kumagai 2016).
Eight refiners promise to shut 418,000 bbl/d of capacity and receive 494,000 bbl/d of import quotas.
Numerous reports of illegal trade in quotas and tax evasion.
2017
The government clamps down on exports by independent refiners who are given no quotas to control excessive operating rates and improve air quality.
-Thirty-two independent refiners are allowed to import 2.04 MMbbl/d of crude. -Independent refiners promise to shut down 1.24 MMbbl/d of capacity (Zhou and Jaipuriyar 2018) . The government puts in place more stringent checks and balances to ensure that all criteria are met before awarding import quotas.
China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announces that it will halt new crude import quota applications from existing refineries, effective from May 5, to control imports and capacity expansions (Zhou and Jaipuriyar 2018) .
New refining projects are approved. These include a 301,000 bbl/d refinery by the independent company Xuyang Petrochemical and a 321,000 bbl/d plant by the independent company Shenghong Petrochemical. A 301,000 bbl/d joint project between state-owned Norinco and Saudi Aramco is reinstated (Zhou and Jaipuriyar 2018) .
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The government turns an environmentprotection fee collected from companies into an environment tax, effective January 1.
The State Administration of Taxation announces tighter regulations effective March 1, to enforce collection of a $38 per barrel ($0.24 per liter) gasoline consumption tax and a $29 per barrel ($0.18 per liter) tax on diesel, in an effort to stop tax avoidance (Paraskova 2018b) .
The NDRC unveils measures to punish refiners that fail to meet the government's capacity expansions, and environmental and safety guidelines. Punishments include the outright closures of capacities under 40,000 bbl/d, and the closures of illegal expansions and refiners that are found to be flouting the guidelines.
The History and Current Status of Crude Imports and Crude Oil Runs From Chinese Teapot Refiners
Chinese teapot refiners prepare to obtain permits to blend ethanol to comply with the nationwide mandate.
The increase in import quotas leads to a visible build up and surge in floating storage at Shandong import terminals in early April (Kayrros 2018 here is no readily available detailed and accurate information on the exact size of the spot market and bilateral agreements for spot and term sales. However, a close examination of publicly available data suggests that the demand for and supply of long-term contracts versus spot contracts rises and falls with world oil prices. When prices are high, crude oil producers prefer to lock customers in. Customers, on the other hand, tend to prefer spot markets when prices are low and falling. This interaction between buyers and sellers results in an increase in the number of long-term contracts when crude oil prices are rising.
According to publicly available sources, the size of the spot market has risen steadily since the early 1980s. A number of industry analysts, including Daniel Yergin of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, estimate the size of the spot market to have been 10% of all physical crude oil sales in 1979, rising to over 50% in 1982 (Kaminska 2017) . By 2007, these volumes are believed to have fallen to only 35-40% of total physical crude oil sales. More recently, over the past three years, independent traders and commodity houses have expanded their volumes significantly, by well over 65%, with volumes traded by Vitol, Glencore and Trafigura reaching 17 MMbbl of crude oil and petroleum products a day, a 70% increase over the 10 MMbbl/d in 2014. When volumes from Gunvor and Mercuria are included, total volumes reach levels as high as 22 MMbbl/d, 67% of the 32.83 MMbbl produced by OPEC in August 2017 (Hume and Sheppard 2017) .
While the exact nature of the contractual agreements -spot or term -is unavailable for the volumes in question, there is 'hearsay' evidence of the rise in spot and independent market transactions during periods of 'low' and falling oil prices. Figure  4 presents the results of a Factiva search for "longterm oil contracts" plotted against Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot crude oil prices. The primary y-axis measures the volume of news containing the phrase "long-term oil contracts," and The Relationship Between Spot Oil Prices, Term Contracts, and the Rise of Chinese Teapot Refineries the secondary y-axis -on the right-hand side of the chart -displays the percentage change in world oil prices. Unsurprisingly, the volume of news stories and industry talk about long-term contracts tends to increase when analysts suspect an upward change in the direction of price movements and when prices are rising.
The results are even more compelling when long-term contracts in China are considered. Figure 5 displays the results of a Factiva search for "China long-term oil contracts." The chart provides visual evidence that the volume of news and industry reports relating to 'new' long-term contracts increases when world oil prices rise. This supposition is supported by quantitative analysis. A simple regression analysis on the number of documents and reports counted by Factiva's analysis, and the spot price for European Brent on a free on board (FOB) basis suggests that each percentage increase in spot crude oil prices results in a 0.61 increase in the number of news reports and documents citing Chinese long-term crude oil contracts. The Relationship Between Spot Oil Prices, Term Contracts, and the Rise of Chinese Teapot Refineries
It is interesting to note that the analysis does not support the proposition that the rise of spot purchases by teapot refineries has had a negative effect on the demand for long-term contracts during the period under consideration. There also appears to have been more than enough oil to satisfy demand. The Chinese government created what has amounted to a "new country's worth of oil imports" when it announced in 2015 that Chinese teapot refineries would be permitted to buy spot crude on the world oil market, a privilege that had previously only been extended to the state-owned oil companies (Downs 2017). The inclusion of a dummy variable accounting for the rise of the teapot refineries in our regression suggests that the number of long-term contract announcements has increased significantly since 2015. Appendix C reports the results of the regression analysis.
While the rise of spot sales to teapot refineries does not appear to have had any effect on the number of news stories on Chinese long-term contracts, its effects on actual contracts, shorter-term contracts, and future demand are uncertain. What has changed is the composition of Chinese crude oil imports. In 2016, Russia became the top supplier of crude oil to China, displacing Saudi Arabia for the first time since 2007 (Downs 2017). Strategic spot sales to teapot refiners can be used as part of a strategy to expand the list of trusted customers and to win back market share.
Not all of Russia's increase in its share of Chinese crude oil imports was due to its marketing efforts. Saudi Arabia reduced its total exports from 2,750.9 million barrels in 2016 to 2,620.4 million barrels in 2017, while Russia increased its total exports from 2,008.4 million barrels to 2,031.8 million barrels over the same period. While Saudi Arabia reduced its total oil exports, it increased its exports to China from 373.8 to 382.6 million barrels, thereby increasing China ̓s share of its total exports from 13.59% to 14.6% (BP 2017).
Project Assumptions: The Reference Case NPV of Spot Crude Oil Sales to Teapot Refineries From a Joint Stockpiling Facility in Asia
A n analysis of spot crude oil sales from an MEP should take into account the implications, if any, of regional, or global, crude oil prices and of the MEP's existing volume of term oil sales. As a result, the analysis must be conducted relative to a well-defined 'base case' or starting positon. This section defines the assumptions underlying the starting position for this analysis. To be precise, it outlines the assumptions underlying the base case reference NPV of spot crude oil sales from a storage facility located close to several Chinese teapot refineries from the perspective of a major MEP subject to a strict production quota.
Note: The number of spot oil sales from Middle East producing countries to Chinese teapot refineries has been rising steadily since 2016. On April 25, 2016, Reuters reported what might well be the first crude oil cargo of spot sales from Saudi Aramco to an independent Chinese refinery. The 730,000 barrel cargo was lifted from Okinawa, in Japan, and shipped to Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals Co., a teapot refiner (Chen 2016) .
Following the methodology utilized in Considine et al. (2019) the primary assumptions underlying the calculation of the base or reference case NPV are as follows:
1. The main port of transit for Middle East crude (Ras Tanura [RT]) is located more than 25 sailing days away from key markets in Asia, such as in Qingdao, China. The joint oil stockpiling facility, similar to Okinawa, is located near to the teapot refineries, only three sailing days away from Qingdao.
2. The MEP can store approximately 6.2 MMbbl of crude oil free of charge throughout the project's lifetime.
3. In return for the free use of storage facilities, the owner gets a priority claim on the oil stocks in case of an emergency.
4. The storage facility owner can claim the crude oil storage as quasi-government inventory so that about 50% of the oil stored is counted as part of their national strategic crude oil reserves (Reuters 2016).
5. The value of utilizing the joint storage facilities for commercial purposes derives primarily from its proximity to key markets in Asia. A three-day sailing trip permits the sale of spot crude to the area. From the perspective of the MEP, this adds considerable value as the voyage from a major oil export port to Qingdao takes well over 25 days and would be prohibitively long for spot sales to the area. For further details on the project assumptions see Considine et al. (2019) .
6. The commercial portion of the storage can be cycled (injections and withdrawals of all 'commercial storage') at least six times a year.
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Under the terms of our hypothetical agreement, the volumes of crude oil supplies held in storage by the MEP can be used to supply Asian customers on a term basis, for term sales or long-term deals signed months in advance. The use of storage for spot sales from the MEP during times of high oil prices is relatively new and adds considerable value to the joint storage agreement. Concerning the effects of an increased supply of crude on the crude oil price, the study assumes liquid forward and futures markets, so that all of these operations can be completed and hedged at the market prices at the time of execution. Finally, a number of factors leading to tight markets and supply and demand shocks can contribute to a sudden and short-term increase in spot prices in Asia. For example, independent refiners in China are often caught short, struggling for supply at the end of the year as they try to meet the provincial government's crude oil import targets (Platts 2016). In this case study, the joint storage facility can accommodate 6.2 MMbbl of crude and oil products. Assuming 50% of these volumes are reserved for strategic stockpiles, and slippage of 1%, about 3.07 MMbbl can be used for spot crude oil sales to Asian markets (potential slippage is due to leaks and errors in the physical drawdown procedure).
The project yields an expected value for gross income earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) expected net present value (XNPV) of approximately $3.5 billion at a 2.5% discount rate. This is with crude oil production costs of $3.50/bbl, transportation costs from the MEP to the strategically located storage facility of $1.67/bbl and assumed spot crude oil sales FOB at Okinawa of 40% of the available capacity of Arabian Medium, 30% of Arabian Heavy and 30% of Arabian Light crude. Table 2 illustrates the assumptions underlying these projections, including the free lease of crude oil storage, 50% strategic oil requirements and sales of 3.07 MMbbl per year.
Crude oil feedstock for Chinese teapot refiners is assumed to be equally allocated between three types of Arabian crude oil: heavy, medium and light. This is a valid assumption, as the mix of crude oil employed by the teapot refiners varies significantly according to market conditions. The mix has included Russian ESPO with a sulfur content of 0.62%, Venezuelan Tia Juana Heavy with 2.66% sulfur, and a number of diverse crude grades from Saudi Arabia, Africa, and Latin America (Tan 2016) .
The futures curve for Dubai crude was used to estimate the futures curves for Arabian crudes (CME Group 2016). The relationship between Arabian Medium and Dubai Mo01 was estimated by two variable regression analyses. The relationship between Brent and the minimum price of light, medium and heavy crudes from competing areas was estimated using a similar method. The formulas for the minimum price of light, medium, and heavy crudes, and the results of these regressions are described in detail in Considine et al. (2019) . T he potential incremental or fair market value of the strategic spot oil sales can be estimated by calculating how much a market player (consumer or customer) would pay to secure the right to purchase crude oil from the MEP at the strategically located stockpile (Carmona and Durrleman 2003) . That value, in turn, will depend on the price of crude oil from competitors around the world and can be estimated as a simple European spread option.
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Potential customers for this option include trading companies, refiners and shipping companies that are interested in hedging their shipping costs. They also include refiners hoping to lock in a lower price for their spot oil sales and hedge their transportation costs from the joint oil stockpiling facility to Quingdao. The position can also be layered on synthetically by speculative traders, such as Vitoil or Mercuria, and hedged on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The price p, or the fair market value of the European spread option, is given by the following equation, which is derived in detail in Appendix B.
1-7:
Where:
1. K = The exercise price level: The cost of freight to transport crude from the storage facility to a major Asian market such as Qingdao.
2. T = The expiration date: The option is expected to expire two months after the value or settlement date. 5. r = The short-term risk-free interest rate.
The price of Arabian Heavy, Medium and Light (Platts 2016) plus the cost of sea transportation from the MEP to the strategically located storage facility of approximately $1.67/bbl is derived from KAPSARC calculations, with the distance calculated using the website www.sea-distance.org, and the cost estimated using the KAPSARC Global Trade Oil Model.
The study assumes that the transportation costs from the joint oil stockpiling facility to Qingdao are constant at 82 cents per barrel. As a result, it is possible to use the transportation cost as the exercise price. In an alternative formulation, the transportation costs can be added to the value of S2, and the exercise price can be set equal to zero. All of the asset prices here are quoted as free on board (FOB) so that the cost of delivering the goods to the FOB port is included, but the customer is responsible for shipping the goods from that point to the final destination.
Note: All the costs of getting to the final destination might be included in an alternative formulation of the option, including detailed interest costs on any fair market value of the European spread option, is given by the following derived in detail in Appendix B, Equations 1-7: p = e $%& '(s * − s , − K) / f & (s , s * )d 2 3 d 2 4 cise price level: The cost of freight to transport crude from the storage facility sian market such as Qingdao. borrowed funds, and transportation costs to the specific teapot refiners. It should be noted that the potential purchasers of the option, the refiners or customers, might prefer the simpler version outlined above. They might also prefer to handle those details themselves, as they might have their own fleet of boats and service providers, thereby enabling them to secure a lower cost and a higher value for the options. A trader fabricating the synthetic position can simply ignore these details, and use a combination of call and put options to simulate the position (Delany 2017) .
A detailed listing of the inputs or exogenous variables used in this analysis is presented in Considine et al. (2019) . The solution to the above equation, which is the price or fair market value of the option calculated for three separate grades of crude are: The very low estimate of the value for the Arabian Medium vs. Minimum Medium grade arises from the prices used at the time of the estimation. The spot price for Arabian Medium was higher than the price of competing crudes, illustrating the fierce competition for market share in the region at that time.
As Table 2 shows, adding the options value increases the XNPV of the project by $157 millionwell over 4% -to an XNPV of about $3.68 billion.
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Securing New Markets in Asia: The Value of Strategic Spot Crude Oil Sales to Teapot Refiners G eopolitical and fiscal risks have the capacity to change the results of this analysis significantly. The key economic variables subject to commodity and transaction risks in the case of spot oil sales to Chinese teapot refineries include the grade of crude oil to be exported (heavy, medium or light), the amount of crude oil required to be maintained in the joint stockpiling facility at all times for strategic purposes, commodity prices, costs and the project discount rate. The following variables were selected for sensitivity analysis:
1. The gravity of the crude oil to be exported (heavy, medium or light).
2. The amount of crude oil required in the facility at all times for strategic purposes.
3. The project discount rate.
Slippage.
5. The production costs per barrel.
6. The transportation costs from RT to Okinawa.
7. Brent futures.
Dubai futures.
Probability density functions for these variables were estimated using historical data series and are described in detail in Appendix B (equations B1 and B2). The Monte Carlo simulations were performed utilizing a Mersenne Twister random number generator and a Latin hypercube sampling methodology.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized as follows. The potential value of the spot oil sales from the strategic stockpiling facility is equal to the XNPV of the reference case plus the XNPV of the options value shown in Table 2 . Given crude oil production costs of $3.5/bbl, transportation costs from RT to Okinawa of $1.67/bbl and assumed spot crude oil sales FOB at Okinawa of 40% Arabian Medium, 30% Arabian Heavy and 30% Arabian Light crude, the project 'base' or reference case assumptions are an XNPV of $3.52 billion at a 2.5% discount rate.
Adding the optionality of spot oil sales has the potential to increase the XNPV gross revenue EBITDA of the project via spot sales by an expected $156.94, or 4.5%, to $3.68 billion. Figure 6 illustrates the probability distribution of the potential gross revenue stream XNPV EBITDA of the option for spot sales, given the uncertainty of world oil markets and the probability distributions of the variables listed above (XNPV is defined in Appendix B). Table B1 of Appendix B shows a comparison of the results of our analysis with and without the additional options value of strategic crude oil sales. As might have been expected, adding the optionality increases the minimum XNPV of the gross revenue via spot sales from $279.59 million to $938.05 million, thereby reducing the risk, or downside of the project significantly. The upside potential is considerable: There is a 5% probability that strategic spot oil sales could increase the gross income of the pre-existing project by an average of $830.89 million (Table 3) . 
Sensitivity Analysis and Monte Carlo Simulations
A sensitivity analysis was performed to illustrate the effects of economic uncertainty on the value of the incremental spot oil sales using stepwise multiple regression, to estimate the regression coefficients of the exogenous variables (Draper 1966) . The results of this regression and the estimated regression coefficients are presented in Table 4 , and figures 7 and 8.
The first variable to be considered is the amount of strategic oil supplies required to remain in the storage tanks at all times for emergency drawdown. A 1% increase in the amount of oil that must remain in storage reduces the gross income EBITDA plus the options value by well over $78 million.
The implications for gross income EBITDA for the project assumptions -the reference case level of straightforward term sales from the Okinawa storage facility -is significant. Even without the additional optionality offered by the ability to secure safe supplies of MEP crude at market prices, a 1% reduction in the amount of oil reserved for strategic purposes raises the expected income from the base case, or reference case, assumptions by more than $71 million.
The next variable to be considered is the gravity of the crude oil sold. A 1% increase in the volume of light crude sold (approximately 31,000 barrels per strategic cycle) increases the value of the strategic crude oil sales FOB at Qingdao by approximately $1.25 million. A shift from medium-gravity crude to the heavy grades has the opposite effect, reducing the value of strategic sales by $1.25 million. A $1 increase in transportation costs (RT to Qingdao) and crude oil production costs reduces the project's value by over $92 million and $66 million, respectively. 
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Another important variable is the forward curve for Dubai crude. Unsurprisingly, a $1 increase in the price of Dubai increases the value of the reference or base case without the additional optionality of strategic spot oil sales by approximately $47.50 million ( Table 4 ).
The regression coefficients for gross income plus the options value of the strategic oil sales to teapot refineries depends on the spread, or difference, between spot prices for crude oil FOB at Okinawa and the minimum price of competing crudes FOB at Qingdao (Figure 2 ). In this case, it is the relative movement in prices that determine the 'market' value placed on the ability to reserve the right to purchase Arabian crude at spot prices at a future date in order to hedge or protect against sudden adverse price movements. Unsurprisingly, an increase in the price of Brent relative to Dubai adds significant value to the spot oil sales from the strategic joint stockpiling facility at Okinawa.
Holding everything else constant:
A $1.00 increase in the price of Brent M1 increases the XNPV of gross revenues EBITDA plus the options value by $100 million.
A $1.00 reduction in the price of Dubai increases the XNPV of the facility by $56 million.
Adding an extra cycle: Increasing the number of times the commercial volume of crude oil can be completely withdrawn from inventory and sold on the spot market by one cycle increases the gross income EBITDA by approximately $36.25 million.
Increasing the volume of light crude sold by 1% (approximately 31,000 barrels per strategic cycle) increases the gross income EBITDA plus the options value by $9.06 million. This suggests that there is considerable value to be derived from shifting strategic sales of spot crudes to lighter crudes when the market permits. Table 4 ). With Dubai crude oil prices reported at $71.14 per barrel on August 12, 2018, a 2.5% reduction in world oil prices would reduce the gross income EBITDA from spot crude oil sales by $85 million over the project's lifetime (Oil Price 2018). This figure may be an overestimate. A major crude oil producer anticipating a reduction in crude oil prices could easily take measures to hedge against this well in advance of the announcement of spot oil sales.
The negative effects of a reduction in world oil prices from increased supply can be mitigated by an increase in the volume of light crudes sold to teapot refineries. Increasing the volume of light crude sold by 1% (approximately 31,000 bbl per strategic cycle) increases the gross income EBITDA by $9.06 million. This suggests that there is considerable value to be derived from shifting strategic sales of spot crudes to teapot refineries to lighter crudes when market conditions are favorable. Indeed, the glut of diesel on Chinese markets in September 2016 led several teapot refineries to search for sweeter cargoes of lower-sulfur crude with high gasoline yields from Africa and Russia (ESPO) (Mathonniere 2016) .
The implications for existing, future term and long-term contracts are not as transparent. There will be no change in total crude oil production if existing production quotas persist. The diversion of crude oil supplies to Asia may result in an effective increase in the price of Brent (and competing crudes) relative to Dubai and the 'official' or spot prices for Arabian crudes FOB at Okinawa. These relative changes will have significant implications for the options value of spot oil sales, which depends on the spread -or difference -between spot prices for Arabian crudes FOB at Okinawa and the minimum price of competing crudes FOB at Qingdao (see Figure 2 ).
As mentioned above, a $1.00 increase in the price of Brent M1 (relative to Dubai) increases the XNPV of gross revenues EBITDA plus the options value by $100 million. With Brent currently trading at levels as high as $72.57 (Bloomberg 2018 ), a 2.5% increase in the price of Brent would increase the XNPV of gross revenues EBITDA plus the options value by $181 million. Alternatively, a 2.5% reduction in the price of Dubai crude (relative to Brent) increases the XNPV of the facility by $99.5 million. The effects of the Dubai crude price movement are realized through the pricing mechanisms for the official prices of Arabian crude. In both cases, the increase in the XNPV of gross oil revenues -existing sales plus the incremental spot oil sales -is positive. 
Alternative Scenario 2: Spot oil sales Result in a 2.5% Increase in World Oil Prices
Alternative Scenario 2 assumes that the sale of spot crude to China results in a permanent 2.5% increase in world oil prices. A $1 increase in the price of Dubai crude increases the value of the crude sales FOB at Qingdao by approximately $47.5 million (see Table 4 ). With Dubai crude oil prices reported at $71.14 per barrel on August 12, 2018, a 2.5% increase in world oil prices would increase the gross income EBITDA from the reference case term oil sales by $85 million over the project's lifetime (Oil Price 2018).
Once again, binding production quotas should result in no increase in global production, and world oil prices should remain constant over the longer term.
In the short run, the increase in spot sales to the region has the potential to result in a future increase in the relative price of Dubai crude, or an effective reduction in the price of Brent relative to Dubai. This would likely be the result of a displacement of spot crude oil sales from alternative suppliers, such as Russia. A $1.00 increase in the price of Brent M1 (relative to Dubai) increases the XNPV of gross revenues EBITDA plus the options value by $100 million. Similarly, a $1 increase in the price of Dubai crude (relative to Brent) reduces the XNPV of the facility by $56 million.
These potential losses can be partially offset by either:
(i) An increase in long-term term contracts to the region. As mentioned previously, each dollar increase in Brent crude oil results in a 0.61 increase in the number of news reports and documents citing Chinese long-term crude oil contracts.
(ii)
An increase in the volume of spot sales of lighter crude oil to teapot refiners.
In the final analysis, regardless of the market conditions, a strategic deployment of spot oil sales to Chinese teapot refiners, taking the gravity of the crude oil sales into account, could potentially add considerable value to a major Middle Eastern producing company with existing term and long-term contracts in the region.
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Securing New Markets in Asia: The Value of Strategic Spot Crude Oil Sales to Teapot Refiners 32 Conclusion T he ability to conduct spot sales from a strategically placed storage facility to capture market share in new and emerging markets, such as the Chinese teapot refineries, represents a potential source of value to crude oil producers and marketers. That value can be estimated for a variety of facilities and under a number of different market conditions using the valuation method developed in this case study. The potential value from these strategic spot sales will depend on several factors, including the volatility of crude oil prices, the gravities of crude targeted, and the proximity of alternative suppliers.
A joint stockpiling facility located close to the teapot refiners in China holds substantially more value than a simple net present value calculation would suggest, given its potential for numerous sales of crude oil. The potential fair market value of spot oil sales from the joint oil storage facility depends on the price of crude oil from global competitors; it can be estimated as a simple European spread option.
Our analysis follows the methodology presented in Considine et al. (2019) . Given (i) crude oil production costs of $3.5/bbl barrel, (ii) transportation costs from RT to Okinawa of $1.67/bbl, (iii) assumed spot crude oil sales FOB at Okinawa of 40% Arabian Medium, 30% Arabian Heavy and 30% Arabian Light crude, and (iv) a base case or reference value of existing crude term and long-term crude oil sales of $3.52 billion.
Adding the optionality of strategic spot oil sales has the potential to increase the XNPV gross revenue EBITDA of the project via spot sales by an expected $156.94 million, a significant 4.5%.
The amount of strategic oil supplies required to remain in storage tanks at all times, in case of an emergency drawdown, is the variable with the most impact on the net present value of spot oil sales.
The next most important variable is the gravity of the crude oil sold. A 1% increase in the volume of light spot oil sales (approximately 31,000 barrels per strategic cycle) increases the value of the project by approximately $1.25 million.
A shift from medium gravity crude to the heavy grades has the opposite effect, reducing the value of strategic sales by $1.25 million.
A $1 increase in transportation costs (RT to Qingdao) and crude oil production costs reduces the project's value by over $92 million and $66 million, respectively.
Another important variable is the forward curve for Dubai crude. Unsurprisingly, a $1 increase in the price of Dubai increases the value of the reference or base case assumptions by approximately $47.50 million.
The value of strategic spot oil sales to teapot refineries depends on the spread -or differencebetween spot prices for crude oil FOB at Okinawa and the minimum price of competing crudes FOB at Qingdao (Figure 2) . It is the relative movement in prices that determines the 'market' value placed on the ability to reserve the right to purchase Middle Eastern crude at spot prices at a future date, in order to hedge or protect against sudden adverse price movements. An increase in the price of Brent relative to Dubai crude adds significant value to the spot oil sales from the strategic joint stockpiling facility at Okinawa.
Holding everything else constant:
Conclusion
A $1.00 reduction in the price of Dubai crude increases the XNPV of the facility by $56 million.
Adding an extra cycle, so increasing the number of times the commercial volume of crude oil can be completely withdrawn from inventory and sold on the spot market by one, increases the gross income EBITDA by approximately $36.25 million.
Increasing the volume of light crude sold by 1% (approximately 31,000 barrels per strategic cycle) increases the gross income by $9.06 million.
The analysis suggests that there is considerable value to be derived from shifting strategic sales of spot crudes to lighter crudes when the market permits.
Our case study shows clear benefits to the MEP from the strategic sale of spot crude to Chinese teapot refineries located in Shandong province. This is true for a comprehensive range of different assumptions and scenarios concerning future oil prices, and the impact of additional 'spot' volumes on regional and global crude oil prices. In the reference or base case scenario, spot prices generated by such sales are assumed to have no impact on either the term prices or volumes of term contracts. This is primarily the result of the assumption that the MEP is subject to strict production quotas.
The benefits are reinforced under the alternative scenario which assumes that increased spot sales to the region lead to a 2.5% reduction in world oil prices, and hence a reduction in the prices under term and long-term contracts for the MEP. While this result may be counterintuitive, it is not unlikely. In this case, increased spot sales to the region have the potential to affect the relative price of regional crude (Dubai) relative to Brent, thereby increasing the options value of the spot oil sales, which depend on the spread or difference between spot prices for Arabian crude oil and competing crudes.
In the final scenario, the increased spot sales to the region are assumed to result in a 2.5% increase in world oil prices and the price of term contracts. In this case, the relationship between regional crude oil prices and the volume of term contracts is slightly more complicated, but on balance, the total revenues from sales by the MEP are unlikely to be affected adversely. Any negative effects can be easily mitigated through the sale of lighter crude oil grades to teapot refineries.
In the final analysis, if existing production quotas persist, there will be no lasting implications for world oil prices due to the diversion of sales to the Asia Pacific Region. New customers and competitively priced strategic assets makes it possible for MEPs to expand their market shares and revenues for years to come.
Given the framework and model construction, there is considerable potential for further study and analysis, including: 
Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo sim
As shown in Considine et al. (2019) , the use of stoch to accommodate risks and uncertainties in crude oil p Ellefsen 2008). Nischal (2010) employs stochastic mo a crude oil dispatch plan from a process plant in I simulation to minimize commodity procurement ris exposure to unanticipated movements in exchange r
As mentioned previously in the case of spot oil s economic variables subject to commodity and tran exported (heavy, medium or light), the amount of cru stockpiling facility at all times for strategic purpose discount rate. The following variables were selected Given the discounted net present value model presented in Table 2 , Monte Carlo simulations were performed utilizing the probability distributions listed above, a Mersenne Twister random number generator (Matsumoto 1998), and Latin Hypercube sampling methodology (Mckay 1979) . Table B1 presents the results of the Monte Carlo Simulation for gross income EBITDA with and without the options value. 
Calculation of XNPV for non-periodic cash flows
When cash flows are not necessarily periodic, as is the case for the incremental spot sale provided here, the XNPV can be calculated for the project as follows:
Where: P i = the i th payment d i = the i th payment date d 0 = 0 th payment date Note: The XNPV uses actual dates to determine the timing of cash flows, thus providing a more accurate result when cash flows are sporadic. As a result, although the cash flows in this example would appear to be regular, there is no cost to using XNPV in this example. In fact, there is considerable benefit in using it as it draws the reader's attention to the fact that cash flows from spot sales can easily be sporadic and would then require the use of the XNPV formula (Blackwood 2017 Note: Brent was chosen as a benchmark for this analysis, due to an increasing number of crude oil contracts using dated Brent as a reference price since 2008. This trend was primarily due to a decline in production from major crude oil fields in Asia traditionally used as benchmarks, including Malaysia Tapis crude, and Indonesian Minas and Duri (Giaever-Enger and Booth 2008).
Appendix C: Estimating the Relationship Between Chinese Long-Term Contracts, the Spot Price of Brent, and the Rise of the Teapot Refineries
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About the Project
This project intends to assess how the concept of energy security and energy security strategies of suppliers and consumers have evolved following the recent shifts in the global energy markets and balances, and the implications and potential directions of this evolution. The project is focused on the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Northeast Asia and their inter-regional collaboration, with a special emphasis on Saudi Arabia and China. Besides conventional energy security dimensions, we plan to address the following research propositions: How can the magnitude of the changes in energy security be verified and quantified? Are the current energy export/import portfolios of the countries in focus optimal, considering existing and potential risks and diversification costs? Is there a subtle shift from energy security to enterprise and competition?
The goal of this research project is to study the other side of the coin -the security of oil demand from the net-exporters perspective. How do large oil exporters trade off risk and rewards in ensuring the security of demand? In the first phase of this research project, a comparative static model of global oil trade is developed to empirically measure the impacts of alternative crude oil market shares across segmented markets; to assess the strategic choice national oil companies (NOCs) have in valuing alternative sales market portfolios in the context of the trade-off along the risk-reward frontier; and to compare international oil company behavior as a benchmark for NOCs.
